Sierra Leone was told that the 80 agreed Tripartite recommendations were “fully actionable and implementable.” The phrase was repeated so often that it became part of the political sales pitch. But the legislative record now raises an uncomfortable question: Actionable and implementable by whom, and on whose terms?

Some of the most important recommendations did not emerge from the constitutional reform process in the form in which they were originally agreed.

Recommendation 36 proposed an independent Search and Nominating Committee for the appointment of Electoral Commissioners and the PPRC Chair. Its purpose was to reduce presidential control over these appointments and strengthen public confidence in electoral institutions. Although the proposal entered the reform process, it did not survive parliamentary consideration. The existing appointment structure was retained.

Recommendation 47 called for qualifying dual citizens to be permitted, subject to appropriate safeguards, to contest parliamentary elections. Instead, the constitutional proposals focused on allowing qualifying dual citizens to serve as Ministers. These are not equivalent reforms. The agreed pathway for dual citizens to participate in parliamentary elections was effectively left behind.

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Recommendation 53 agreed to a presidential election threshold of 50% plus one vote nationally, with a requirement to obtain at least 25% of the vote in at least half of the districts. The Bill changed this formula to a simple national majority, with a minimum of 20% in at least two-thirds of the districts. The broader principle of requiring both a national majority and a measure of geographical support survived, but the specific formula agreed upon through the Tripartite process was substantially altered.

Recommendation 34 proposed that elections be held on the last Saturday of March, April, or May every fifth year. The Bill instead selected the second Saturday in November. Once again, the underlying objective may have survived, but the specific agreement was changed.

Then there is proportional representation. Recommendation 78 did not agree that proportional representation should automatically be incorporated into the Constitution. Rather, it recommended that Sierra Leone first conduct a national dialogue to determine the most appropriate electoral system. The Bill moved beyond that compromise by incorporating proportional representation into the constitutional framework. In effect, consultation became conclusion.

And outside the Constitutional Amendment Bill sits Recommendation 70, which proposed that political parties that fail to win any elected office in two consecutive general elections should be deregistered through an amendment to the Political Parties Act. Although this recommendation was agreed upon, the implementation matrix did not provide a clear legislative pathway for putting it into effect.

This is where the phrase “fully actionable and implementable” begins to lose its force.

Many of the Tripartite recommendations required not only constitutional amendments but also changes to the Public Elections Act, the Political Parties Act, and other relevant legislation. If there is no clear legislative timetable, no transparent public mechanism for tracking those statutory reforms, and no explanation when agreed provisions are modified, delayed, or abandoned, then “fully actionable and implementable” risks becoming little more than a political slogan.

The Supreme Court now adds another important dimension. The dispute surrounding the 10 August parliamentary vote and the interpretation of Section 108 of the Constitution means that the legality of aspects of the constitutional amendment process remains contested. The Court may ultimately determine whether the constitutional requirements, including the necessary parliamentary threshold, were properly satisfied.

But whatever the Court ultimately decides, the broader political question will remain.

If Tripartite was an agreement, why did so much of that agreement change on the way to becoming law?

And if the statutory recommendations were genuinely “fully actionable and implementable,” where is the legislation that demonstrates their implementation?

That is the standard Sierra Leone should now apply to the Tripartite process: not the slogans, not the speeches, and not the political assurances—but the laws actually enacted and the reforms actually delivered.

Ultimately, the credibility of the Tripartite process will not be determined by what was promised. It will be determined by what survived the journey from agreement to law.